Three Federal Courts, Three TCPA Questions, One Evolving Legal Landscape

A series of recent federal court decisions is offering businesses and litigators a clearer, though not always consistent, picture of how courts are interpreting key provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). 

While one federal court in Pennsylvania has reinforced that text messages fall within the National Do Not Call (DNC) protections under Section 227(c), a Texas court has reached a different conclusion under Section 227(b), holding that text messages alone cannot support a prerecorded voice claim. 

Meanwhile, a Kansas court has allowed a prerecorded voice lawsuit to move forward based solely on allegations of repetitive, generic voicemail messages.

Taken together, the decisions highlight an important distinction that is often overlooked. Rather than creating a direct conflict over whether text messages are covered by the TCPA, the courts are interpreting different statutory provisions, each with its own language and requirements. 

At the same time, the rulings demonstrate a broader judicial trend toward closely examining the statutory text instead of relying exclusively on longstanding regulatory interpretations following the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.

Pennsylvania Court Affirms DNC Rules Apply to Text Messages

The most significant recent development came from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Pero v. Brown-Daub Chevrolet of Nazareth. 

The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss after concluding that text messages qualify as “telephone calls” under Section 227(c) of the TCPA, which governs the National Do Not Call Registry.

The plaintiff alleged that she had registered her mobile number on the National Do Not Call Registry in 2021 before providing it to the dealership in October 2024 to receive information about trucks for sale. After later opting out of text communications, she allegedly received six additional marketing text messages between January and March 2025.

The dealership argued that Section 227(c) regulates telephone calls, not text messages. The court disagreed.

Rather than focusing solely on the word “call,” the court examined Section 227(a)(4), which defines a telephone solicitation as the initiation of a “telephone call or message” for the purpose of encouraging the purchase of goods or services. 

Although Congress could not have specifically contemplated text messaging when it enacted the TCPA in 1991, the court concluded that Congress intentionally drafted the statute broadly enough to include communications transmitted by telephone beyond traditional voice calls.

The Court Relied on Statutory Language, Not Just FCC Guidance

One notable aspect of the Pennsylvania decision is how the court approached agency guidance following the Supreme Court’s elimination of Chevron deference.

The court acknowledged that federal courts must now independently interpret statutes rather than automatically defer to administrative agencies. However, it also recognized that FCC interpretations remain persuasive where they reflect the agency’s experience and Congress has expressly delegated rulemaking authority.

The court gave considerable weight to the FCC’s 2024 clarification confirming that National Do Not Call protections extend to text messages. Ultimately, however, the decision rested on the statutory language itself, finding that a text message is simply a message transmitted by telephone and therefore falls within the TCPA’s DNC framework.

The ruling also noted that its interpretation aligns with the overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed Section 227(c) in recent years.

Texas Court Reaches a Different Result Under Section 227(b)

Only days later, a federal court in the Southern District of Texas addressed another TCPA lawsuit involving text messages. While the outcome differed, the court was interpreting a separate provision of the statute.

In Uwagbai v. Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC, the plaintiff alleged that he received two “pre-recorded text messages” and sued under Section 227(b), which prohibits certain calls made using an artificial or prerecorded voice.

The court dismissed the case because the communications at issue consisted solely of text messages.

Section 227(b) specifically prohibits initiating a telephone call to certain telephone lines using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message. Because no audible prerecorded voice was alleged to have been used, the court found that the statutory requirements had not been met. 

It concluded that the communications were “nothing more than text messages” and therefore did not satisfy the elements necessary for liability under that particular subsection of the TCPA.

Importantly, the Texas court was not deciding whether text messages qualify as telephone calls under the National Do Not Call provisions. Instead, it determined that Section 227(b)’s prerecorded voice restrictions require an actual voice component, something absent from the plaintiff’s allegations.

The decision illustrates why TCPA cases involving text messages cannot always be compared directly. Liability often depends less on the communication method itself and more on which statutory subsection a plaintiff invokes.

Kansas Court Allows Prerecorded Voice Claims to Proceed

A third decision, issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, focused on another recurring issue under the TCPA: when plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the use of a prerecorded voice.

In Matthew Mayhew v. Home Care Pulse, LLC, the plaintiff claimed he received fourteen voicemail messages over several months from the same telephone number. According to the complaint, each message contained virtually identical survey invitations, did not identify him by name, and several began midway through a sentence before continuing normally.

The defendant argued these allegations were too conclusory to support an inference that a prerecorded voice had been used.

The court rejected that argument.

Because the TCPA does not define “artificial or prerecorded voice,” the court explained that plaintiffs are not required to satisfy an unusually demanding pleading standard at the motion to dismiss stage. Instead, they must only allege sufficient facts to make the claim plausible.

The repetitive nature of the messages, their standardized wording, their generic content, and the truncated openings collectively supported a reasonable inference that the messages were prerecorded. 

The court even noted that a voicemail beginning in the middle of a sentence may strengthen that inference because a live caller would not ordinarily begin speaking mid-conversation.

As a result, the prerecorded voice claim survived the defendant’s motion to dismiss, allowing the litigation to continue.

Different Provisions, Different Standards

Viewed together, these cases underscore an important legal distinction.

The Pennsylvania decision addressed Section 227(c), which regulates telemarketing communications to numbers listed on the National Do Not Call Registry.

The Texas case involved Section 227(b), which governs calls made using an artificial or prerecorded voice.

The Kansas decision also centered on Section 227(b), but addressed whether the plaintiff had plausibly alleged that prerecorded voice technology had actually been used.

Because each subsection contains different statutory language and different legal elements, courts may reach different outcomes without necessarily creating conflicting precedent.

For businesses, this means that compliance cannot rely on broad assumptions about how the TCPA applies to text messages or voicemail campaigns. 

Instead, organizations must evaluate which provisions govern each communication channel and ensure their compliance programs address the specific requirements applicable to SMS marketing, prerecorded voice campaigns, and telemarketing calls separately.

The Post-Loper Bright Landscape Continues to Evolve

Another common thread running through these decisions is the increasing emphasis on statutory interpretation following the Supreme Court’s Loper Bright decision.

Courts are no longer automatically deferring to federal agency interpretations under the Chevron doctrine. Instead, judges are independently analyzing statutory language while still considering agency expertise where appropriate.

The Pennsylvania court provides perhaps the clearest example of this evolving approach. Although it acknowledged the FCC’s guidance extending DNC protections to text messages, it grounded its holding primarily in the TCPA’s own language rather than relying solely on regulatory interpretation.

That approach may influence future litigation involving other unsettled questions under the TCPA, particularly as courts continue examining how decades-old statutory language should apply to modern communication technologies.

What These Decisions Mean Going Forward

Recent TCPA decisions suggest that courts remain willing to apply longstanding consumer protection principles to evolving communication methods, but only where the statutory language supports doing so.

For companies that rely on SMS marketing, the Pennsylvania ruling reinforces the importance of honoring National Do Not Call registrations and maintaining effective opt-out procedures across all marketing systems.

For businesses using automated voicemail campaigns, the Kansas decision demonstrates that repetitive, standardized messages may be sufficient to survive early dismissal even before plaintiffs obtain technical evidence regarding the dialing platform.

Meanwhile, the Texas decision serves as a reminder that not every TCPA claim involving text messages will succeed. Plaintiffs must still establish the specific statutory elements required under the subsection they invoke.

Rather than resolving every question surrounding the TCPA’s application to modern communications, these recent decisions collectively illustrate how courts are refining the boundaries of the statute one provision at a time. 

As additional cases move through federal courts, businesses can expect further clarification, but they should not assume that one ruling automatically answers every TCPA question involving text messages, prerecorded voices, or telemarketing communications.