Seventh Circuit Says Marketing Texts Are Not “Telephone Calls” Under TCPA Do-Not-Call Provision
Case Snapshot
- Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- Case: Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398
- Decision Date: July 14, 2026
- Core Issue: Whether marketing text messages qualify as “telephone calls” under TCPA Section 227(c)(5)’s private ‘Do Not Call’ provision.
- Key Allegation: Plaintiffs alleged Blackstone Medical Services continued sending unwanted marketing texts after recipients opted out and registered on the National Do Not Call Registry.
- Court Holding: Text messages are not “telephone calls” for purposes of Section 227(c)(5)’s private right of action.
- Outcome: Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the TCPA claims.
- Notable Detail: The decision is the first federal appellate ruling directly addressing whether Section 227(c)(5)’s private ‘Do Not Call’ provision applies to text messages.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has become the first federal appellate court to hold that text messages are not “telephone calls” under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s private ‘Do Not Call’ provision, creating a significant precedent for businesses operating in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.
In Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, the court affirmed dismissal of a proposed class action alleging unwanted marketing text messages violated Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA. The decision limits private lawsuits under that specific provision for text messaging campaigns within the Seventh Circuit while leaving other TCPA provisions and state laws intact.
Court focuses on statutory language
The case involved consumers who alleged Blackstone Medical Services continued sending marketing texts and calls promoting home sleep tests after recipients replied “STOP” or registered their numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry. The district court dismissed the TCPA claims, concluding the statute’s private right of action applies only to telephone calls, not text messages. The Seventh Circuit agreed.
Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, Judge Michael B. Kirsch said the court’s analysis began with the ordinary meaning of “telephone call” when Congress enacted the TCPA in 1991.
The court noted that text messaging did not yet exist when the law was passed, with the first text message sent in 1992. Looking to contemporaneous dictionary definitions, the court concluded a telephone call referred to communication through sound, while text messages do not reproduce sound.
Differences within the TCPA proved significant
The opinion also relied heavily on the structure of the TCPA itself.
The court observed that other portions of Section 227 refer broadly to “telephone solicitations,” a term Congress defined as “the initiation of a telephone call or message.” However, the private right of action in Section 227(c)(5) allows lawsuits only after receiving more than one “telephone call.”
According to the panel, Congress intentionally used narrower language in the private right of action, indicating that messages and calls should be treated differently. The court also pointed to the TCPA’s fax provisions as evidence that Congress understood how to regulate text-based communications separately from telephone calls.
Court distinguishes prior TCPA decisions
The plaintiffs argued prior Supreme Court and circuit court decisions treated text messages as calls under the TCPA.
The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument, explaining those cases arose under Section 227(b), which governs autodialed and prerecorded communications, rather than Section 227(c)(5)’s private ‘Do Not Call’ provision. The court said the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez merely assumed texts qualified as calls because neither party disputed the issue, an assumption the Supreme Court later acknowledged in Facebook v. Duguid.
The opinion also declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Howard v. Republican National Committee, noting that case likewise interpreted Section 227(b) rather than Section 227(c)(5).
FCC interpretation did not control
The plaintiffs also relied on the Federal Communications Commission’s 2024 rule extending National Do Not Call Registry protections to text messages.
The Seventh Circuit said that rule was promulgated under a different subsection governing “telephone solicitations” rather than the private right of action at issue. Citing the Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v. McKesson Corp., the court held it was not bound by the FCC’s statutory interpretation and instead conducted its own analysis.
What the decision means
The ruling provides binding precedent throughout the Seventh Circuit, which includes Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin.
For debt collectors, creditors and other businesses using SMS communications, the decision narrows one potential avenue for TCPA litigation involving marketing text messages under Section 227(c)(5). However, it does not eliminate compliance obligations for text messaging.
The court emphasized that unwanted text messages may still be regulated under other portions of the TCPA, including Section 227(b), as well as through FCC enforcement and state telemarketing statutes.
The decision also increases the likelihood of further appellate review as courts continue to interpret whether text messages constitute telephone calls under different provisions of the TCPA.