Florida Court Says Text Message ‘STOP’ Request May Also Revoke Consent for Calls

Case Snapshot

• Court: U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
• Case: Zagury v. Puragain Water
• Decision Date: Aug. 11, 2026
• Core Issue: Whether a consumer’s “STOP” response to a text message could revoke consent for subsequent telephone calls.
• Key Allegation: The plaintiff alleged that calls continued after she responded “STOP” to an SMS message.
• Court Holding: The court declined to hold that the revocation was necessarily limited to text messages and found that the scope of the request could require consideration of the surrounding circumstances.
• Outcome: The TCPA claim concerning calls following the text opt-out was permitted to proceed.
• Notable Detail: The court cited an FCC cross-channel revocation requirement even though the FCC has delayed implementation of that portion of its rule until Jan. 31, 2027.

A federal court in Florida has allowed a Telephone Consumer Protection Act claim to proceed based on allegations that a consumer’s “STOP” response to a text message also revoked consent to receive subsequent calls, raising an important cross-channel consent issue for companies communicating with consumers by phone and text.

In Zagury v. Puragain Water, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida rejected an argument that the consumer’s text opt-out necessarily applied only to text messages. The Aug. 11 ruling suggests that the scope of a revocation request may depend on the circumstances surrounding the request rather than simply the communication channel through which it was made.

The decision warrants particular attention because the FCC has delayed implementation of a rule that would expressly require certain revocation requests to extend across calls and texts.

Court Rejects Channel-Specific Argument

The plaintiff alleged that she revoked consent to receive communications when she responded “STOP” to an SMS message.

Puragin Water did not dispute, for purposes of its motion, that the response could revoke consent for text messages. Instead, the company argued that the opt-out did not prevent it from subsequently calling the plaintiff.

The court declined to adopt that interpretation at the dismissal stage.

According to the court, determining whether the plaintiff’s request revoked consent for subsequent calls requires consideration of the circumstances surrounding the revocation. That issue could not be resolved solely by treating the SMS response as limited to the texting channel.

The decision therefore allows the TCPA claim concerning subsequent calls to move forward. It does not establish after a full evidentiary record that every “STOP” response to a text automatically revokes consent for calls.

FCC Rule Creates an Important Complication

Part of the court’s reasoning raises a separate regulatory question.

The FCC adopted consent revocation rules in 2024 that included a provision requiring callers, under specified circumstances, to treat a revocation made in response to one type of communication as applicable to future robocalls and robotexts for which consent is required.

The FCC subsequently delayed that cross-channel portion of the rule. In January 2026, the agency extended the waiver through Jan. 31, 2027, while it considers potential changes to the requirement.

Other portions of the FCC’s consent revocation framework remain relevant, including the principle that consumers can revoke consent through reasonable methods.

That distinction matters in Zagury. Although the court referenced the broader FCC cross-channel provision, the older reasonable-means framework provides a separate basis for examining what the consumer intended when she sent the opt-out request.

What the Ruling Means for Consumer Communications

For receivables management companies and other businesses communicating through multiple channels, the decision highlights the risks of maintaining completely separate consent records for calls and texts.

The ruling does not create a nationwide rule requiring every text opt-out to terminate every type of telephone communication. It does, however, demonstrate that courts may interpret a consumer’s revocation request more broadly than the specific channel used to communicate it.

Organizations should consider whether their systems can identify opt-out requests across communication platforms and whether ambiguous requests require additional review.

Companies engaged in marketing communications face another potential issue. Depending on the circumstances, a text message opt-out could implicate internal do-not-call requirements in addition to TCPA consent requirements.

For ARM companies using multiple vendors, dialers, texting platforms, or business units, the case also illustrates the operational importance of maintaining consistent consent and revocation records. A consumer’s request recorded in one system may become relevant to communications initiated through another.

Industry Takeaway

The practical lesson is broader than the ultimate outcome of Zagury. Businesses should be cautious about assuming that a consumer who says “STOP” through one channel has consented to continued communications through another.

The FCC’s cross-channel requirement remains delayed, and its ultimate form could still change. In the meantime, Zagury demonstrates that TCPA plaintiffs may pursue cross-channel revocation theories under existing consent principles, leaving the scope of a consumer’s request as a potentially fact-intensive question.