North Carolina Ruling Expands Federal Split Over TCPA Texting Claims

Case Snapshot

• Court: U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina
• Case: Card v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., No. 26-CV-00433
• Decision Date: Sept. 3, 2026
• Core Issue: Whether TCPA Section 227(c)(5)’s private right of action covers text messages
• Key Allegation: Card alleged he received unwanted texts despite having his number registered on the National Do Not Call Registry
• Court Holding: Text messages do not constitute “telephone calls” for purposes of the Section 227(c)(5) private right of action
• Outcome: Complaint dismissed
• Notable Detail: The decision gives the Fourth Circuit its first district court ruling adopting the narrower interpretation and expands that side of the split to five federal circuit regions. The Fourth Circuit region is itself divided. Earlier decisions, including Mey v. Liberty Home Guard in West Virginia, have concluded that text messages can fall within Section 227(c)(5).

A federal court in North Carolina has added the Fourth Circuit to a growing nationwide split over whether text messages can support private lawsuits under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s National Do Not Call Registry provisions.

The Sept. 3 decision in Card v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. marks the first district court ruling within the Fourth Circuit holding that text messages are not “telephone calls” covered by the private right of action in Section 227(c)(5). Courts within the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and 11th circuits have now reached that conclusion, while district courts in several other circuits have ruled that the provision can apply to texts.

The split has accelerated following recent Supreme Court decisions that changed how lower courts approach federal agency interpretations. For businesses using text messaging, including accounts receivable management companies, the result is an increasingly jurisdiction-dependent TCPA litigation landscape.

North Carolina Court Dismisses TCPA Texting Claim

Plaintiff Shawn Card sued R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings Inc. in May, alleging he received unwanted text messages even though his telephone number was registered on the National Do Not Call Registry.

Card sought to represent a proposed class of people who allegedly received similar messages and relied on Section 227(c)(5), which creates a private right of action for a person who receives more than one “telephone call” within a 12-month period in violation of regulations adopted under that subsection.

R.J. Reynolds moved to dismiss, arguing that the statutory language does not extend the private right of action to text messages.

U.S. District Judge Catherine Eagles of the Middle District of North Carolina agreed. The court concluded that text messages do not fall within the private right of action created by Section 227(c)(5), finding persuasive the Seventh Circuit’s recent interpretation of the same provision in Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services.

Five Circuit Regions Now Have Courts Excluding Texts

As of Sept. 10, federal district courts within five circuit regions have issued decisions concluding that Section 227(c)(5)’s reference to a “telephone call” does not encompass text messages:

• Fourth Circuit: Card v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings in North Carolina.
• Sixth Circuit: Stockdale v. Skymount Property Group in Ohio.
• Seventh Circuit: Decisions from Illinois and Indiana, now reinforced by the Seventh Circuit’s appellate ruling in Steidinger.
• Eighth Circuit: Rush v. SelectQuote Insurance Services in Missouri.
• 11th Circuit: Multiple decisions in Florida and Georgia, including Davis v. CVS Pharmacy, Sayed v. Naturopathica Holistic Health, Radvansky v. Kendo Holdings, and Radvansky v. 1-800-Flowers.com.

That amounts to decisions from federal courts located in at least seven states: North Carolina, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Florida, and Georgia.

The Seventh Circuit has gone further than the district courts. In July, the appeals court held that texts are not calls within Section 227(c)(5), making that interpretation binding on federal district courts in Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin. The Seventh Circuit said the ordinary meaning of “telephone call” when Congress enacted the TCPA, along with the structure of Section 227, supported treating calls and text messages differently for purposes of this particular private right of action.

Other Courts Say TCPA Provision Does Cover Texts

The other side of the split remains substantial.

Federal district courts within the First, Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits have ruled that Section 227(c) can encompass text messages. Courts within the Ninth Circuit have also treated texts as actionable under the TCPA, although the scope of Ninth Circuit appellate precedent remains an issue because its relevant appellate decision involved a different TCPA subsection.

Recent examples illustrate how sharply courts disagree. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has repeatedly concluded that texts qualify as calls for Section 227(c) purposes, including in Newell v. Children’s Dental Health Associates, Cole v. C/T Install America, and Pero v. Brown-Daub Chevrolet. A Connecticut federal court has likewise sided with the broader interpretation.

Courts in the Fifth Circuit have reached similar conclusions. In Alvarez v. Fiesta Nissan, a Southern District of Texas court found that a text message falls within the statutory language, and a Louisiana federal court subsequently adopted that reasoning.

The result is roughly balanced geographically at the circuit-region level, but not precedentially. Five circuit regions have district court authority excluding texts, while at least five have authority supporting their inclusion. The Seventh Circuit remains the only federal appellate court identified in this developing line of cases to have squarely decided Section 227(c)(5), holding that it does not cover texts.

The Tenth Circuit appears to remain without a district court decision squarely addressing the issue.

Supreme Court Decisions Reshape TCPA Analysis

The changing landscape follows the Supreme Court’s decisions in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo in 2024 and McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp. in 2025.

Those decisions altered the role federal agency interpretations play when courts interpret statutes. In Card, Eagles noted that earlier decisions frequently relied on Federal Communications Commission interpretations when treating texts as calls. Following McLaughlin, courts must independently determine the meaning of the statute rather than treating the FCC’s statutory interpretation as controlling.

That shift has produced competing interpretations of Congress’ wording.

Courts excluding texts emphasize that Section 227(c)(5) specifically says “telephone call,” while other portions of the TCPA use different or broader terminology. Courts reaching the opposite result have looked to the meaning of the statute when Congress enacted it in 1991, its broader structure, and the FCC’s longstanding treatment of text messages under the TCPA.

What the Growing Split Means for ARM Companies

The expanding split does not mean businesses can treat text messages as exempt from the TCPA.

The dispute concerns the specific private right of action in Section 227(c)(5). Other TCPA provisions, FCC regulations, and state telemarketing laws can independently regulate text communications.

For ARM companies, creditors and other businesses using text messaging, Card nevertheless provides another defense against proposed class actions alleging that texts to numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry violate Section 227(c)(5).

The jurisdiction now matters considerably. A company facing essentially the same Section 227(c)(5) texting allegation could encounter different interpretations depending on where the lawsuit is filed. Unless additional courts of appeals or the Supreme Court resolve the disagreement, businesses should continue monitoring both federal appellate and district court decisions before changing texting compliance programs.