Georgia Federal Court Rules Text Messages Are Not “Calls” Under TCPA Do Not Call Provisions
A federal court in the Northern District of Georgia has dismissed claims that telemarketing text messages violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s (TCPA) Do Not Call provisions, adding to a growing body of case law distinguishing text messages from telephone calls under the statute.
In Irvin v. Sonic Industries Services, LLC, No. 3:25-cv-00242-LMM (N.D. Ga. Apr. 20, 2026), the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that text messages do not qualify as “calls” under Section 227(c) of the TCPA.
Court Rejects TCPA Claims Based on Text Messages
The plaintiff alleged that Sonic Industries Services sent at least twelve telemarketing text messages after his number had been placed on the National Do Not Call Registry in February 2025. The complaint argued that these messages violated the TCPA’s restrictions on telemarketing communications to registered numbers.
Sonic moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the statute’s Do Not Call provisions apply only to telephone calls, not text messages. The court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims.
Plaintiff’s Arguments on “Call” Definition
The plaintiff advanced several arguments in an effort to broaden the interpretation of the term “call” under the TCPA:
- The ordinary meaning of “call” should include attempts to communicate by telephone, including text messaging
- Section 227(c)(1) directs the Federal Communications Commission to protect consumers from both calls and text messages
- Excluding text messages would leave consumers without a statutory remedy under the Do Not Call provisions
- Congress delegated interpretive authority to the FCC for this section
- The court should apply an “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review to agency interpretation
The court rejected each of these arguments.
Court Applies “1991 Definition” Approach
The court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which emphasized that statutory meaning is fixed at the time of enactment. Applying that principle, the court determined that the meaning of “telephone call” under the TCPA must be interpreted based on how the term was understood in 1991.
Under that framework, the court concluded that text messaging technology does not fall within the original definition of a telephone call. As a result, the plaintiff’s first three arguments were rejected, and the court reaffirmed the reasoning applied in Radvansky and other recent decisions within the Eleventh Circuit.
No Delegation to FCC Found
The court also rejected arguments that the FCC has authority to interpret the term “telephone call” under Section 227(c). It found no express delegation from Congress granting the agency authority to expand or redefine that term within the statute.
The court further noted that reliance on agency interpretation was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s rejection of certain forms of judicial deference in Loper Bright. As a result, the plaintiff’s remaining arguments were dismissed.
Broader Implications
The decision adds to a developing trend across multiple jurisdictions that distinguishes text messages from calls under the TCPA’s Do Not Call provisions. While the issue is not yet fully settled nationwide, courts have increasingly adopted a textualist approach grounded in the statute’s original meaning.
For compliance professionals and organizations engaged in telemarketing, the ruling provides additional support for the position that text messages may fall outside the scope of Section 227(c). At the same time, the evolving nature of TCPA litigation suggests continued scrutiny and the potential for further appellate review.
